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Policy schemes that aim to stimulate the cultivation of biofuel crops typically ignore the spatial het-
erogeneity in costs and beneﬁts associated with their production. Because of spatial heterogeneity in
biophysical, and current agricultural production factors, potential gains from stimulating biofuel crops
are non-uniformly distributed across space. This paper explores implications of this type of heterogeneity
for the net beneﬁts associated with different subsidy schemes. We present a simple framework based on
discounted cash ﬂows, to assess potential gains from introducing the notion of heterogeneity into sti-
mulation schemes. We show that agricultural subsidy spending can be reduced in a Pareto efﬁcient way
and simultaneously improve the total stimulation potential of biofuel policies, when schemes: 1) are
production based instead of land based; 2) accommodate differences in opportunity costs, and 3) target
sites where subsidies for conventional agricultural land-use types are high. These results are robust for a
range of different bioenergy prices and the relative gains of addressing these key elements in policy
compared to conventional stimulation schemes increase with lower bioenergy prices, and are largest
when low prices coincide with high emission reduction ambitions.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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The constraints of ﬁnite natural resources in combination with
concerns about global warming have led researchers and policy-
makers to pay increased attention to the topic of sustainable en-
ergy policies and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The
switch to biofuels as a transportation fuel source has been put
forward as a possible contribution to carbon emission reduction
plans and overall sustainable energy strategies [25,49,38]. Second-
generation ethanol production from lignocellulosic material is
generally considered to avoid (partly) social and environmental
impacts linked to biofuel production [52], and could become a key
contributor to emission reductions. Although lignocellulosic
ethanol production from biomass may become a suitable option in
the future, large-scale production is not economically feasible at
present and stimulation policies have to be implemented to
achieve future bioenergy usage ambitions [67]. Many countries are
struggling to achieve 2020 goals for fuel standards. In 2015, the
average European blending share of crop based ethanol and bio-
diesel was estimated at respectively 3.3% and 4.3%, and at about
0.6% for non-food based biofuels [29]. Though the sector has
achieved considerable growth worldwide in recent years [51], the
strong decline in crude oil prices that started in the second half of
2014 has put the competitiveness of biofuels under severe pres-
sure, and the current policy ambitions are not expected to lead to
signiﬁcant higher production in the next decade [44]. Because
economic beneﬁt is arguably the most important incentive for
adoption, efﬁcient subsidy strategies are of relevance for the future
of biofuels and might not only be key in reaching 2020 fuel
standards, but might determine when, or whether, we ever get a
viable model for large scale production.
The focus of this paper is to explore possibilities to minimize
subsidy spending and simultaneously increase the total stimula-
tion potential of biofuel policies, while maintaining the income
levels of farmers. Such possibilities allow for Pareto improvement
with respect to the current situation as society can both save
money on subsidies and gain from environmental beneﬁts related
to biofuel production, while proﬁts of farmers would be unaffected
by the subsidy reform. Reducing spending and increasing the sti-
mulation potential of schemes can contribute to the overall cost
effectiveness of policies and might strengthen the case of bioe-
nergy production in the political arena. In past years, different
studies proposed heterogeneous allocation of resources under
different environmental policies, for example carbon sequestration
contracts [2], air pollution emission trading programmes [31],
vehicle emission abatement [42], and policies that promote in-
vestment in renewable electricity generators [26]. Current bioe-
nergy stimulation policies typically do not recognize that there is
substantial spatial variation in costs and beneﬁts associated with
biofuel crop production. This heterogeneity relates to interaction
between policies stimulating the production of bioenergy, spatially
heterogeneous production factors, agricultural land-use patterns,
and other agricultural policies. The central thesis of this paper is
that introducing the notion of spatial heterogeneity into subsidy
schemes allows for more efﬁcient allocation of subsidies, and po-
tentially increases net social beneﬁts by decreasing subsidy costs
and increasing positive externalities. We build our analysis on the
following three elements: ﬁrst we assess spatial heterogeneity in
Net Present Value (NPV) of current agricultural production sys-
tems; we then estimate site-speciﬁc net social costs and beneﬁts
of stimulation schemes; and ﬁnally, we compare the relative efﬁ-
ciency of alternative subsidy schemes in terms of associated po-
tential net beneﬁts. We repeat the analysis for a range of different
bioenergy prices to show how the results change when the re-
lative competitiveness of conventional land use and bioenergy
production changes. We apply our analysis to explore productionof a speciﬁc second-generation bioenergy crop - Miscanthus
(MiscanthusGiganteus) - in the Netherlands, a country with an
advanced agricultural sector that has a high economic value per
hectare. The Netherlands is currently far behind the European
average for sustainable energy usage, and as we shall see in our
application of the developed theory, could beneﬁt from more ef-
fective bioenergy policy design.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss inefﬁciencies that arise due to land hetero-
geneity. Section 3 details our methods. Section 4 describes our
application to Miscanthus in the Netherlands. Section 5 presents
the results, followed by a discussion and conclusion in Section 6.2. The importance of spatial heterogeneity in agricultural
policy
Agricultural systems are strongly determined by spatially het-
erogeneous agro-economic, socio-economic, and local biophysical
conditions [15]. Spatial economic models that build upon this
heterogeneity conﬁrm that biomass is able to provide a substantial
contribution to the overall energy supply. This future bioenergy
potential has been assessed on the global scale [36,53], at the
European level [61,12,27,28], and at national levels [5,57,62]. An
overview of the different assessments and their respective
strengths and weaknesses is given by [18], who point out that
spatial variation in production characteristics is the most im-
portant aspect in assessing bioenergy potentials. Recent studies
focusing on local opportunities for biofuel production were able to
pinpoint speciﬁc areas of interest by using micro data on pro-
duction characteristics [63,14]. Understanding the economic im-
plications of spatial variability in local production factors might
help researchers and policymakers in the ﬁeld of environmental
economics and resource management work towards more efﬁcient
forms of policy. However, existing agro-economic and bioenergy
stimulation policies often do not explicitly address spatial het-
erogeneity and abstain from insights gained from bioenergy po-
tential assessments.
Two examples illustrate this lack of attention to spatial aspects.
The governments of Canada and the United States have proposed
policies in which farmers are paid for the adoption of certain
management practices to sequester carbon dioxide in agricultural
soils [1,68]. In the European Union, farmers who grow bioenergy
crops can apply for a standard land based subsidy [21]. Such a
subsidy scheme is analogous to the proposed Canadian and United
States government subsidy scheme as farmers are paid for
adopting site-speciﬁc practices. Market-based incentives, however,
are generally seen as more efﬁcient than command-and-control or
environmental design standard policies because there are cost-
efﬁciency differences in abatement strategies among the entities
within a sector, for example when both costs and environmental
beneﬁts differ among plots [59,55]. Efﬁcient agricultural policies
that aim to increase environmental beneﬁts by inﬂuencing the
management decisions of farmers, must therefore take into ac-
count the heterogeneity of the biophysical and economic factors
that determine the agricultural system [37]. Paying farmers to
adopt certain management practices in a land based system, dis-
regarding the biophysical differences among their production
sites, is generally seen as inefﬁcient [35,3,30].
We particularize by distinguishing between two types of in-
efﬁciencies in bioenergy stimulation schemes: overfunding and
misallocation of funds. When a farmer produces biofuel under a
(government-funded) carbon contract, the contract value is part of
the farmer's private proﬁt function. In the economic environment
of an emission trading market, contract values are conditional on a
spatially varying factor, that is, the quantity of biomass produced
Table 1
Overview of the alternative subsidy schemes distinguished in this study.
Heterogeneous Conventional
Land
Based
Production
based
Land
based
Production based
Single focus SFLB1 SFPB2 CLB3 CPB4
Integrated focus IAFLB5 IAFBP6
Minimize LUC MLPB7
1 single focus land based.
2 single focus production based.
3 conventional land based.
4 conventional production based.
5 integrated agricultural focus land based.
6 integrated agricultural focus production based.
7 minimized land-use change production based.
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farmers, the price of one unit of carbon. It follows that the income
generated by farmers through carbon contracting is a monotonic
transformation of the spatial distribution of production quantities,
which has a direct relation not to local production costs but to the
local biophysical conditions that determine biomass yields.
Farmers with comparative advantages thus possibly receive aids
that greatly exceed the marginal costs of bioenergy crop produc-
tion, resulting in allocation of excessive funds and ex post
inequalities.
Misallocation of funds occurs when spatial characteristics that
are not part of the private proﬁt function appear in the social
welfare function. This difference can originate from both the cost
and the beneﬁt side of the economy. One mechanism through
which the social cost function differs from the private cost func-
tion, is that the production of bioenergy crops can reduce subsidy
distributed elsewhere in the market. Subsidies for crops are mu-
tually exclusive, meaning that farmers can only opt for a single
crop subsidy per plot at a time. Under the assumption that avoided
subsidies for conventional land uses will return efﬁciently to so-
ciety, low social costs do not necessarily coincide with low private
costs in their joint spatial distribution. The possibility exists that
for any given farmer, the private bioenergy production proﬁts are
below zero (a subsidy is required, disregarding the potential
proﬁts related to other land-use types), while the net social cost of
sustaining the required subsidy is negative. This happens for ex-
ample when farmers receive subsidies for conventional land-use
types that exceed the subsidy requirements to produce bioenergy,
while the private proﬁts, after subsidy, of both alternatives are
equal. In this case there is room for a Pareto-efﬁcient reduction in
conventional subsidies. Generally, if positive private opportunity
costs for biomass production at a certain point in the spatial dis-
tribution coincide with negative social costs for sustaining local
bioenergy production in the joint spatial distribution, possibilities
for Pareto improvement exist and it could be said that society is
allocating its funds to the wrong sites.
A similar issue arises on the beneﬁt side of social welfare. Since
the production of bioenergy crops is associated with positive ex-
ternal effects - perennial crops sequester carbon in their root
systems and the use of biofuels reduces carbon emissions - a
strictly positive spatial distribution of externalities exists condi-
tional on the local biophysical conditions. This spatial distribution,
part of the spatial social beneﬁt distribution, is not internalized in
the spatial distribution of private beneﬁts. The optimal land-use
patterns from a societal perspective will thus differ from patterns
that arise from private decisions. Summarizing, spatial hetero-
geneity in local production characteristics under a policy that in-
adequately accounts for spatial differences leads to inefﬁcient
outcomes due to two principles:
1. A non-uniform spatial distribution of marginal production costs
leads to overfunding at production sites that have comparative
advantages, when subsidies are distributed uniformly across
plots.
2. If the spatial distributions of social and private costs and social
and private beneﬁts differ, schemes that do not promote inter-
nalization of externalities and instead follow private optimiza-
tion decisions, misallocate funds from a societal perspective.1 We use contracts and subsidies somewhat interchangeably throughout the
paper because we do not explicitly differentiate between types of entities, but view
society as the ﬁnal entity that pays for such contracts.3. Methodology
We develop a spatially explicit economic assessment strategy
to evaluate potential net beneﬁts of subsidizing bioenergy at the
grid-cell level. Both the cost and the beneﬁt side of the model
build upon an explicit representation of land heterogeneity andrequire micro-data on biophysical conditions, market prices, and
agricultural land use. By combining this information, we estimate
the NPV of the currently existing agricultural land uses and of
bioenergy crop production using a multiple-year time span, thus
incorporating long-term decision processes related to perennial
crop management and start-up investment costs. The difference in
the economic performance of bioenergy crop production and
conventional agricultural production types is used to determine a
minimum required contract value for each plot. The net social cost
of the stimulation policy is calculated by comparing the minimum
required subsidies with subsidies distributed among conventional
land uses. The spatial distribution of potential social beneﬁts of
bioenergy production is based on the emission offsets provided by
local biomass production quantities, and the amount of carbon
sequestered in the root systems of perennial crops. By comparing
the net costs of subsidizing with the beneﬁts associated with the
subsidized sites, we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of dif-
ferent types of policies. The next section introduces the seven
stimulation schemes that we shall explore in our application.
Section 3.2 provides further details to the structure of the model.
3.1. Different spatial policies
A government that engages in bioenergy stimulation can either
subsidize farmers directly through a periodical land based pay-
ment or introduce a carbon contracting system in which farmers
receive funds by providing carbon emission offsets to entities,
including the government, that are willing to buy such contracts to
suppress their carbon rating.1 Contracts or subsidies based on
emission offsets are referred to as production based schemes as
they directly relate to the quantities of produced biomass. Both
types of periodical payments can be homogeneous across space, as
in conventional schemes, or they can be altered to account for
spatial heterogeneity. Heterogeneous subsidy schemes allocate the
exact amount of funds to each farmer needed to sustain the local
production of bioenergy crops.
We analyse seven alternative bioenergy stimulation schemes
(Table 1) that address heterogeneity to various degrees. We ﬁrst
distinguish between spatially heterogeneous and conventional
(homogenously distributed) subsidies. Within the category of
heterogeneous subsidies, a second distinction is made between: 1)
single focus (SF) schemes that subsidize plots where the local
opportunity costs for biofuel production are lowest, and minimize
the total funds spent on bioenergy stimulation; and 2) integrated
agricultural focus (IAF) schemes that also take into account how
2 In this paper we make use of the following notation: (discounted) summa-
tions of any symbol are given by its respective capital, e.g. ≡ ∑ =Z zi
I
i1 , similarly for
sets, capitals contain their lowercase as elements, we index variables by land-use
type with a superscript such that ≡ =z ze l e is identical and reads as the variable z
under bioenergy production, and write constraints between braces {}, e.g. { } ∈i A I A
reads as all elements i for which rule “A” holds, are members of the set IA”.
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schemes aim to limit total aggregate spending on agricultural
subsidies by subsidizing plots where net social costs for biofuel
production stimulation are lowest. This integrated approach is
more efﬁcient as it captures reductions in the aggregate agri-
cultural subsidy spending by decreasing the, often excessive,
subsidies for other types of production. Both SF and IAF schemes
offer farmers a single subsidy that does not depend on the farmer's
choice of production type. Under the assumption that farmers
optimize proﬁts, and that land conversion occurs accordingly,
farmers that receive less subsidy after the policy reform are re-
conciled by increased productivity associated with the alternative
production system. So, in our simple framework, both SF and IAF
schemes reduce spending in an Pareto efﬁcient way. These sti-
mulation strategies are particularly interesting for biofuel stimu-
lation schemes that generate positive externalities associated with
emission reductions, but the implications of the results stretch out
over other conventional agricultural subsidy schemes. In a sense,
heterogeneous schemes undo a policy induced market failure. By
offering farmers site-speciﬁc ﬁnancial support, agricultural land-
use patterns are generated by proﬁt maximization principles that
follow the productivity of farmers. Under homogenous subsidies
that vary per crop type, this equilibrium land-use pattern is dis-
torted and farmers have an incentive to move away from optimum
and produce crops for which their land is not suited, as long as
they are sufﬁciently reconciled by the crop-speciﬁc subsidy.
Both heterogeneous and conventional subsidies are analysed
under per-hectare and per-tonne contracts. Additionally, we ana-
lyse policy that is fully directed at minimizing land-use change by
allocating subsidies on a command-and-control basis to the sites
associated with highest biomass production potentials.
3.2. Spatial economic model
The model that we apply consists of several elements, and we
ﬁrst detail the overall structure before providing the equations.
The underlying assumption of our approach is that farmers oper-
ate under optimal inputs and subsequently allocate their land
between alternative crops in order to maximize their proﬁts. We
therefore, similar to other land-use allocation models, start with a
proﬁt maximization problem. From this maximization problem,
we derive a simple land-use allocation rule that serves as a
starting point for constructing an indifference surface conditional
on site-speciﬁc subsidy levels. We then formulate restrictions for
homogeneity and heterogeneity of stimulation schemes. Given
these restrictions and the spatial indifference surface, we derive
spatial distributions for the minimum required subsidies under
heterogeneous and conventional schemes. These are compared to
current subsidy spending on conventional crops to derive plot-
speciﬁc social costs of sustaining the required subsidy to convert a
given plot to a bioenergy production site. We separately construct
a spatial distribution of external beneﬁts associated with fossil fuel
savings and carbon sequestered in the root system of the bioe-
nergy crop using a carbon price. The site-speciﬁc net social costs of
sustaining biofuel production is than compared to the beneﬁts
associated with production to map site-speciﬁc potential net
beneﬁts of biofuel production. Finally, we aggregate the local net
beneﬁts of those sites that are covered under a speciﬁc stimulation
scheme to enable a comparison of the total potential beneﬁts as-
sociated with different schemes. The remaining part of this section
details all of the analysis steps.
In our simpliﬁed land-use allocation model, we view the study
area as consisting of a number of production sites indexed by ∈i I .
We assume that in order to maximize their proﬁts, farmers make a
choice between two types of land use = [ ]l c e, , where c denotes
conventional agricultural land use and e denotes the allocation ofenergy crops. The economic decision process for a multiple-year
period that farmers face can thus be described as the following
multi-period proﬁt-maximization problem:2
∑Π π= ( + ) ( )∈ = r
argmax
1 1l L
i
l
t
T
it
l
t
0
Where proﬁts are generated according to the spatial timeseries:
 π φ= ( ) + − − − ( ) ∀ ∈ × ( )p q s w h k o q it 2itl it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
it
l
Where pitl are the plot-level prices for the vector of outputs of
land-use types l at time t, qitl is the vector of outputs, which is a
function of local yield factors φitl, witl are prices for the vector of
inputs, sitl are plot-level subsidies, kitl are ﬁxed costs containing
start-up investments, equipment costs and yearly ﬁxed costs, and
ﬁnally oitl are the ﬁeld operation costs, which may vary with
output qitl.
Let Πie and Πic be real variables and Π ′i denote any particular set
of values of these two variables. Any such set is represented by a
point in a two-dimensional Cartesian space. Let Π Π⊇ ′i be the
superset of all such points and let Πc and Πe be the subsets of Π
including points for which Π ′i produces either a conventional crop
production site contained in Ic, or an energy crop production site
contained in Ie. To be able to assign set membership to Il based on
Πi
l, we require that some further logic exists. The proﬁt max-
imization by land-use choice under mutually exclusive land-use
types provides a rule “ Π( ′)A i ” that deﬁnes the subset ⊆I Ie . This
rule “ Π( ′)A i ” ascribes to each production site contained in I, the
property of belonging to Ie or not, based on any set of values Π ′i for
the two land-use types. The proﬁt-maximization problem in Eq.
(1) leads to the following rule:
Π Π{ > } ∈ ( )i I 3ie ic e
Note that if proﬁts would instead have been stochastic, this and
subsequent results follow similarly under expected value theory if
Πi
e and Πic are consistent estimates of the ﬁrst moments of their
stochastic counterparts. Note also that, though prices are given in a
competitive market, a farmer has the ability to choose the level of
inputs and that a government can choose to change sitl, such that
any pair Π ′i is possible, which in turn according to the timeseries
system Eqs. (1)–(3) can produce any agricultural landscape. If we
keep Πic constant, that is, assuming optimal private inputs and
ﬁxed conventional subsidies, Π Π( ) >sie ite ic has a unique asymptotic
lower bound, Π Π( ) =sie ite ic, on which rational farmers are in-
different between biofuel and conventional agricultural produc-
tion. All sets Π ′i that produce membership in ⧹ ⧹ =I I I Ie c 0 together
constitute this spatial indifference surface on which proﬁt max-
imizing farmers are indifferent between production types. From
Eq. (1) it is clear that under these assumptions it is a straightfor-
ward approach to ﬁnd the local subsidy values site that establish
this indifference surface, e.g. to ﬁnd the lower bound of required
subsidies to sustain biofuel stimulation.
Depending on the policy type, the spatial distribution of the
bioenergy subsidy site can either be spatially homogeneous s¯nt
e ,
which we indicate with an overbar and index by ∈n N with
⊆ [ … | |]N I1, , being a subset of the ordered sequence from 1 to the
cardinality of the entire set of plots, or spatially heterogeneous sˇit
e,
which we indicate with a check. We index by n to distinguish from
heterogeneous schemes. More speciﬁcally, heterogeneous sub-
sidies can be uniquely indexed over the entire set of plots, whereas
3 To conﬁrm that this indeed is a minimum, consider lowering the value of s¯nt
e
for all plots with a minor fraction just sufﬁcient to cause π π<je jc . This will only be
sufﬁcient to stimulate −n 1 plots. Lowering the value of s¯nte for one or several plots
with a minor fraction will break the condition of spatial homogeneity.
4 Note that we can similarly split up net present value proﬁts of conventional
agricultural land use Πjc. Therefore to obtain indifference in a subsidized agri-
cultural system, Π Π= ⟹ =͠ ͠ S Si
e
i
c
i
e
i
c , which means that any positive value for Sic
forms an innovation barrier, preventing bioenergy production at otherwise com-
petitive sites, e.g., where both unsubsidized land-use types would be equally
proﬁtable.
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cardinality of the set of bioenergy production sites, ≔| |n Ie , i.e.
homogenous subsidies increase as the amount of plots converted
to bioenergy production sites increases. Spatially homogeneous
subsidies s¯nt
e are identical across i and must satisfy
¯ ≔¯ ∀ ∈−s s i Ii nte inte1, , hence we shall continue without subscripting i
for spatially homogenous variables. The criterion carries that when
n plots are subsidized, the marginal increase in the aggregate
subsidy by subsidizing the next plot +i 1 that is contained in an
extended set of +n 1 production sites, equals ¯ + (¯ − ¯ )+ +s n s sn te n te nte1, 1, .
Thus, if there are differences in subsidy requirements between a
newly subsidized plot and the most efﬁcient plot of all formerly
subsidized plots, the marginal increase in aggregate subsidy does
not only increase by the subsidy amount required at the new plot
but also by the efﬁciency difference multiplied by the amount of
plots that already received aids. Spatially heterogeneous subsidies,
on the other hand, are ﬂexible and allow for any ﬁnite difference
between subsidies at any two points within the distribution and
satisfy ≤ |ˇ − ˇ | < ∞+s s0 it
e
i t
e
1, . The marginal increase in the aggregate
subsidy of subsidizing the next plot +i 1 when the subsidies are
heterogeneous is just ˇ +si t
e
1, , the subsidy required for production at
the new site. The difference in the marginal increase in the ag-
gregate homogeneous subsidy and aggregate heterogeneous sub-
sidy is ¯ + (¯ − ¯ ) − ˇ+ + = +s n s s sn te n te nte i n t
e
1, 1, 1, . The requirements of the
newly subsidized plot under both schemes are equal, thus the
marginal increase in total subsidy costs is given by (¯ − ¯ )+n s sn te nte1,
and thus depends on the amount of heterogeneity between plots
that drives the difference between (¯ − ¯ )+s sn te n te1, , , and the size of the
policy area n before increasing its extent. The marginal cost
function of converting an additional production site to energy crop
production under homogenous schemes, thus depends on the site-
speciﬁc exogenous determinants that enter any private proﬁt
function within the entire policy area, whereas the marginal cost
function under a heterogeneous scheme is just a function of local
variables. In our application we shall study how the impact of
heterogeneity changes as the size of the policy area grows to the
size of the entire set of potential production sites | | → | |I Ie .
To derive the minimum spatially homogenous subsidies s¯nt
e , it is
necessary to write down the exact relationship between the total
area of sites dedicated to bioenergy production and the decision
rule of Eq. (3), so that we can determine n. Assuming optimal
private inputs under both land-use types, the total bioenergy
production area is given by summing over the individual sizes of
the plots for which the decision rule of Eq. (3) holds.
∑=
( )=
Y y
4
e
i
I
i
e
1
e
Where yie is the individual plot size and Ye the aggregate pro-
duction size dedicated to bioenergy production. Suppose that a
government aims to have a total area of Ye devoted to the pro-
duction of bioenergy crops, than Eq. (4) inversely provides the
amount of required plots to achieve that level of coverage. To ﬁnd
the minimum spatially homogenous subsidy s¯nt
e required to sti-
mulate n plots, we need to establish indifference in the least ef-
ﬁcient production site i¼ j, ∈ [ … ]j n1, , , e.g. the production site
that requires the highest aid. Thus, in the j-th plot, we need
Π Π=je jc to hold and then solve for sjte. As Πje is the subsidized
proﬁt, we can write it as a function of the unsubsidized proﬁt and
a subsidy component:
Π Π= + ( )͠ S 5ie i
e
i
e
where
∑= ( + )=
S
s
r1i
e
t
T
it
e
t
0There are multiple solutions to site in Eq. (5) as cash ﬂows may
vary throughout years, for example a lump sum in the ﬁrst year
can be the NPV equivalent of an annuity. The discounted total
subsidy Sie is, however, unique, so it follows that indifference
Π Π=je jc holds when Π Π= − ͠Sje jc j
e and bioenergy subsidy is equal
to the unsubsidized proﬁt gap. Using the homogeneity rule, it
follows also that the discounted total homogenous subsidy for any
plot equals that of the least efﬁcient plot ¯ =S Sn
e
j
e. For any pro-
duction area size Ye containing n plots, we can write the spatially
homogeneous subsidy that minimizes the aggregate subsidy as a
function of the largest unsubsidized proﬁt gap occurring in all the
bioenergy production sites Ie.3
Π Π¯ = ( − ) ( )
͠
∈
S max
6n
e
i I
i
c
i
e
e
One important result that we can directly derive from this is
that within the current system, farmers are paid to withhold from
innovation, and the introduction of new subsidy systems is re-
quired for any innovative crop before it can be produced on a large
scale.4
Using the decision rule of Eq. (3), we can similarly construct a
distribution of spatially heterogeneous minimum subsidies at
which farmers are tangent to choosing l¼e, by ﬁnding the exact
values for Sie that coincide with values of Π ′i that produce set
membership in I0. Hence, to ﬁnd the plot-speciﬁc discounted
spatially heterogeneous minimum subsidy Sˇi
e
, we need to estab-
lish indifference Π Π=ie ic at all plots i. Straightforward use of Eq.
(5), gives us:
Π Πˇ = − ( )͠S 7i
e
i
c
i
e
The spatial distribution of net subsidy spending is calculated as
the difference between conventional subsidies and bioenergy sti-
mulation subsidies. Net subsidy spending is what society pays to
produce environmental beneﬁts through biofuels; therefore, we
will refer to it as social costs, though we do not take into account
other potential costs than direct spending.
= − ( )C S S 8ie ie ic
Apart from the net subsidy spending involved in bioenergy
stimulation, we consider also the beneﬁts associated with avoided
carbon emissions. The potential social beneﬁts at a speciﬁc pro-
duction site are given by the beneﬁts of emission savings and the
difference between beneﬁts from additionally sequestered carbon.
∑ ε σ σ= + ( − )( + ) ( )
ε ε
=
B
p q p
r1 9
i
e
t
T e
it
e
it
e
it
c
t
0
Where pε is the carbon price, εe are the emissions saved per unit
of bioenergy production, and sitl are the emission saving equiva-
lents of sequestered carbon in the root system of perennial crops.
Net beneﬁts are given by the difference between social beneﬁts
and social costs.
ω = − ( )B C 10ie ie ie
In aggregate, we can quantify the total net beneﬁts by summing
6 Weighted average, making use of the fact that 69.1% of agricultural land is
dairy farming, and there was 90.1% degree of pixel by pixel correspondence for
dairy farming and 71.7% for arable farming.
7 An overall decrease in land supply due to ongoing urbanization is more likely
and could be incorporated in our approach but we exclude this as well as it is not
likely to change the competition between different types of agricultural land use,
but would only adjust the total amounts per types.
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growing bioenergy crops exceed proﬁts from growing conven-
tional crops.
∑ ∑Ω ω ε σ σ= = − = + ( − )( + ) − ( − ) ( )
ε ε
= =
B C
p q p
r
S S
1 11
e
i
I
i
e
i
e
i
e
t
T e
it
e
it
e
it
c
t i
e
i
c
1 0
e
In the rightside equality in Eq. (11), we see the direct relation
between the spatially heterogeneous potential beneﬁts and the
spatial distribution of subsidies allocated to production sites Sie,
where = ¯S Sie n
e for homogeneous subsidies or = ˇS Sie i
e
under het-
erogeneous subsidies schemes. It follows directly from Eq. (11)
that under heterogeneous production factors, the potential gains
under heterogeneous subsidies are higher than those under
homogenous subsidies.5 This should come as no surprise given the
expressions of the marginal costs for converting an additional
farmer derived earlier, but it is an empirically interesting matter to
contrast the differences in total potential net beneﬁts of alter-
native schemes using real data for a range of potential production
area sizes. The straightforward equations suggest that a researcher
armed with micro-data on in- and output price vectors, produc-
tion costs and quantities, land-use patterns, and current subsidy
schemes, is able to do just that by plugging them in Eq. (1), and
evaluating the total net beneﬁt potential under different types of
policy by substituting Sie with values of Sˇi
e
or S¯n
e and calculating Ωe
for the set of sites Ie for which the subsidy is sufﬁcient to convert
proﬁt maximizing farmers into bioenergy crop producers. Simi-
larly, policy-objective related beneﬁt potentials can be calculated
by summing i over the set of production sites Ietarget for which the
total bioenergy crop production = ∑ ∑= =Q q
e
t
T
i
I
it
e
0 1
e
equals a target
amount Qetarget of the bioenergy product. The corresponding size of
the production area Yt can be evaluated with Eq. (4), to compare
the potential size of policy areas. Finally, the subsidy is optimal
when the marginal gains to society from subsidizing the least ef-
ﬁcient plot j equals zero ω = 0je . That is where the marginal social
beneﬁts equal the marginal net costs of subsidizing. Since Sjc is
ﬁxed, we can calculate the value of Sie that corresponds to the
optimum subsidy pattern.
3.3. Modelling production quantities
We propose to approximate the output vector of products with
crop-speciﬁc yield values, which can be directly mapped from
local biophysical features. We model the yield following [60] by
attributing crop-speciﬁc damage scores related to drought Rd and
water-logging Rw according to the local combination of geological
and hydrological conditions. The damage scores are designed to be
used with the yield function below to calculate the crop-speciﬁc
expected yields.
φ= ( )q q 12it
l
it
l
it max
l
,
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟φ = − + ( − )
( )
Rw Rd
Rw
100
100
100 13
it
l
it
l
it
l it
l
The production quantity vector for a speciﬁc land-use type in
the choice model of Eq. (1), qitl, is the crop-speciﬁc maximum at-
tainable yield, qit max
l
, , multiplied by φit
l, that is, the local yield
conditions factor ranging from 0% to 100%. This procedure to
quantify expected yields has been successfully applied to model a
variety of crops in studies for the Netherlands [40,63] and5 Combining Eqs. (6) and (7) leads to ˇ ≤ ¯S Sn
e
n
e, with ˇ < ¯S Sn
e
n
e if there is variation
in Π Π− ͠ic i
e across i. Therefore, Ω Ω( ˇ ) > ( ¯ )S Se n
e e
n
e follows trivially under hetero-
geneous production factors.Argentina [16]. In a similar NPV framework [13] were able to re-
plicate national agricultural land-use patterns in the Netherlands
with 84% degree of correspondence on a pixel by pixel
comparison.6 This shows that Eqs. (1) to (3) in combination with
Eqs. (12) to (13), is not just practical but also appropriate to si-
mulate land use.4. The case of miscanthus in the netherlands
We illustrate our approach to accounting for spatial hetero-
geneity in bioenergy stimulation policies with an application to a
second-generation perennial biofuel crop - Miscanthus - in the
Netherlands. The Netherlands is selected as a study area for several
reasons. First, it has an advanced agricultural sector with high
economic value per hectare and a high population density. Con-
sequently, there is high pressure on land for both urban land uses
and intensive agricultural activities, resulting in strong competi-
tion between different types of agricultural land use [39]. Because
of this competitiveness, there is no unused marginal land in the
study area, so we do not need to account for potential variability in
the supply of agricultural land conditional on marginal changes in
subsidy patterns.7 Second, application of our model in the Neth-
erlands allows us to investigate whether possibilities for Pareto
improvements in current subsidy schemes are substantial even in
a small, and highly competitive agricultural system. Moreover, the
small size of the country has the advantage that we can assume
biofuel prices to remain stable when production volumes increase;
the additional production is not likely to inﬂuence these prices
that follow supply and demand conditions at far larger scales. The
Dutch case is also interesting for policymakers, as it is an example
of a country that is still far behind current national and European
ambitions for sustainable energy, and that lacks a developed
agricultural production system for second-generation biofuels.8
Miscanthus was chosen for our case study because different stu-
dies describe it as potentially high yielding [20,65,64]. [63] show
that Miscanthus is more economically viable than sugar beets for
ethanol production, validating the usefulness of Miscanthus as a
non-food biofuel source. Bearing in mind the arguments put for-
ward by different critics of food-based biofuel [32,58], Miscanthus
could thus be of particular interest for energy production from an
ethical point of view.
Agricultural land use in our study area mainly consist of two
dominant production systems, arable farming and dairy farming,
both modelled with different rotation schemes for sand and clay
soils. For arable farming our model is made operational by using
prices and values described by [14] for in- and output vectors pitc
(prices for agricultural products), qit max
l
, (maximum attainable
yields), hitl (the types and amounts of production inputs), witl (the
prices of the various inputs), kitl (ﬁxed costs including start-up
investments and equipment costs), and oitl (the farm operation
costs). The product prices are updated using 5-year averages of the
product prices reported by [41].9 Local production quantities qitl
are obtained by transforming the maximum attainable yield8 In 2012, 3.4% of fuel sold in the Netherlands originated from ﬁrst and second
generation sources and only 20% of these source materials were produced in the
Netherlands [19]. The main sources for second-generation biofuels of Dutch origin
were domestic garbage, recycled fats and tallow.
9 The 10-year averages for potatoes.
13 All data and assumptions regarding energy usage are contained in Appendix A.
14 The total amount of locations with a negative NPV accounts for only 2.6% of
agricultural land. Possible explanations are discussed in Appendix D.
15 Plot-speciﬁc deviations from the general trend in land-use competition are
possible as the yields of dairy farming production systems and arable farming
production systems are not perfectly spatially correlated. The spatial analysis, on
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l
, using yield factors φi
l estimated using data on
local soil and hydrological with Eq. (13), assuming that these factor
remain stable over time.
Since dairy farming operations do not directly sell grass, but
rely on its yield as an input in milk production, the economic as-
sessment of this production system relies on additional inter-
mediate steps. Production quantities, and yield related costs, for
dairy farming operations are modelled based on the assumption
that cows require energy, supplied by grass, to produce milk. The
energy (grass) supply is linked to local grass yields φigrass. Energy
shortages are computed at each yield level to obtain the amount of
required supplementary energy. We assume that farmers supple-
ment their grass supply with silage maize according to local en-
ergy shortages and the digestable energy content of silage maize.
Silage maize is bought at opportunity costs since maize is grown in
rotation, reﬂecting the costs of not selling it on the market. Milk is
sold as the main product at similar 5-year average prices reported
by [41], and excess silage maize is sold as a secondary product.
Further details regarding the calculations are contained in Table CI
in Appendix C.
Specifying the production conditions for Miscanthus is more
complex as less documented experience is available. Soil and
groundwater related yield reduction values, for example are not
available for Miscanthus. This void was ﬁlled by relying on the
expected local yield values from [63]. Also, a market price for
Miscanthus is not available as the market is undeveloped. We
account for that by using a price range based on imported lig-
nocellulosic biomass prices, averaging €3.25/GJ for pellets from
Latin America, €4.50/GJ for pellets from Eastern Europe, and
€5.50–6.50/GJ for pellets from Scandinavia [34] and converting
biomass to lignocellulosic energy equivalents (see Appendix A).
Recent projections on the development of the biofuel sector taking
into account the 2014 drop in crude oil prices, indicate that in the
short to medium-term, high energy prices and high investments
that could possibly lead to improved conversion rates are unlikely
[44]. We use data on the conventional subsidies sitc that are dis-
tributed in the European Union. Depending on the land-use type,
farmers in Europe receive income support of up to €446 per hec-
tare per year in the Netherlands according to the CAP [22]. Since
the 2003 CAP reform, subsidies of €45 per hectare per year are
available to farmers growing energy crops for 70% of their lands
deployed in energy crop farming [21].10
We combine all prices and other production-related values and
insert them in Eq. (1) to compute the economic proﬁtability of
land at each individual grid-cell. To construct a spatial distribution
of conventional land-use proﬁts Πic, we link conventional land-use
vector l¼c to agricultural land-use data [43] registered at the
parcel level. Since the land-use data set reﬂects the situation at a
ﬁxed moment in time, crop cycles are implemented to simulate
the average NPV of various crop rotation schemes throughout a
period of 20 years.,11,12 We take a weighted average of proﬁts ac-
cording to the share of each crop type in a crop rotation.
By Eq. (6), homogeneous biomass subsidies are determined by
the size of the policy area through the inverse mapping of Eq. (4).
We link Qt target
e
, in our model to the required growth in bioenergy
production to meet the bioenergy market share targets set by the
European Union for 2020 and accordingly determine the required
production area that provides the basis to determine the10 This subsidy system is one of the oldest European policies and is still gra-
dually being transformed. The total expenditures on CAP have declined in the past
decades. In 2011, the total CAP expenditure accounted for 44% of the total European
budget, while in 1986 this was around 75%. Nevertheless, the CAP remains an
important source of income to farmers.
11 We use an inﬂation-adjusted discount rate of 3%.
12 The rotation scheme that we use is contained in Table BI in Appendix B.minimum homogenous subsidy.13 The beneﬁts of emission savings
per unit of biomass product εe are the amount of fuel savings based
on the European reference of 88.3 kg CO2eq/GJ [19] per energy
unit multiplied by a carbon price pε of €20 per ton. The carbon
sequestration beneﬁts site of Miscanthus are based on 8.8 tons
CO2eq reported by [9]. Arable crops in our rotation schemes do not
consist of perennial crops and are assumed to store no signiﬁcant
amounts of carbon in their root systems. Though we are aware of
opportunities for carbon sequestering in the dairy farming sector,
we omit them from our analysis as they are too strongly depen-
dent on site-speciﬁc practices Fig. 1.5. Results
5.1. Economic performance of production systems
Fig. 1 presents our assessment of the economic performance of
various crop cycles in the Netherlands for declining soil suitability.
A brief discussion of the robustness of the results, along with the
distributions of estimated economic performance Πil, is provided
in Appendix D. On average, clay soils perform better than sandy
soils for both arable farming and dairy farming. The economic
performance of arable farming is more sensitive to yield values
than that of dairy farming. This results from the ability of dairy
farmers to import silage maize when the grass yields on their
speciﬁc plots are modest and still make proﬁts on the sales of their
ﬁnal products. Miscanthus is more sensitive to yield than dairy
farming, but less than arable farming Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 14 provides important insights into the general trend of
land-use competition between Miscanthus and conventional
crops.15 Arable farming receives high income support through the
CAP and requires high soil suitability to be proﬁtable, as Fig. 1
shows.16 The NPV of dairy farming is less sensitive to change in
obtainable yield, and its occurrence is centred mainly on lower
suitability soils because arable farming outcompetes dairy farming
on high yielding soils. Dairy farming simultaneously is less sub-
sidized. This causes a self-selection process in which areas with
productive soils receive higher subsidies while areas with low
suitability intersect with land-use types that receive less ﬁnancial
support. The implications for bioenergy production are that the
opportunity costs of producing Miscanthus increase on more
productive soils, because: 1) high-suitability areas self-select into
areas that receive higher income support, and 2) high soil suit-
ability is relatively more in favour of the economic performance of
arable farming than that of Miscanthus.
5.2. Assessing the impacts of different policies
Fig. 2 shows how different subsidy schemes that reorder the
sequence in which production sites are subsidized, produce dif-
ferently shaped social cost and beneﬁt curves. Single focuswhich subsequent sections build, takes this into account but is difﬁcult to gen-
eralize here. The Histograms in Fig. D1 in Appendix D show the factors used in Eq.
(7) to model the spatial comparison between Miscanthus and conventional land-
use proﬁt levels. The map in Fig. E1 in Appendix E shows the resulting spatial
distribution of the minimum required subsidies.
16 Not deducible from Fig. 1, the CAP support includes limited support for dairy
farming production systems through subsidizing maize production, which is a
small percentage of the rotation system. Arable farming production systems receive
direct income support for a large part of their rotation scheme.
Fig. 2. Discounted social marginal cost MC (Cie) and social marginal beneﬁt MB (Bie) cu
private opportunity costs for Miscanthus production, Integrate Agricultural Focus schem
conventional subsidies, ML minimizes land-use change. LB and PB stand for land based a
agricultural land deployed for Miscanthus production.
Fig. 1. Economic performance in discounted euros per hectare of different pro-
duction systems at declining yield levels. 14 Soil and groundwater table combina-
tions that lead to a Miscanthus yield higher than 0.95 or lower than 0.45 are non-
existent in the Netherlands. Dots represent observed combinations of soil types and
ground water tables, lines are linearly interpolated.
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from the erratic cost curves. Integrated agricultural focus schemes
(IAFLB and IAFPB) that take into account the way in which con-
ventional subsidies Sic are allocated, have smoothened cost curves
and a larger integral area between the social cost and beneﬁt
curves. Targeting production sites by production based opportu-
nity costs instead of land based opportunity costs generates cost
curves that are very similar, and efﬁciency differences are not di-
rectly apparent from the cost curves only. Policy that aims to
minimize land-use change, results in a cascading succession of
“separate” cost curves for regimes with similar biophysical condi-
tions, as each biophysical regime includes production sites with
low and high social costs.
Fig. 2 ﬁnally also shows that with high market prices, marginal
costs and beneﬁts have only a few intersections clustered at a high
percentage of land deployed for Miscanthus production. When
market prices are low, there are however numerous intersections
spread out over a large part of the graph area. This implies that the
effect of spatial heterogeneity on the relative performance of SF
and IAF schemes varies strongly depending on the market pricesrves for the ﬁve heterogeneous subsidy schemes. Single focus schemes follow the
es follow social opportunity costs by taking into account the current allocation of
nd production based schemes respectively. Horizontal axis is the percentage of total
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market prices are low, and subsidy requirements are high, it pays
more to subsidize the right plots ﬁrst.
5.3. Comparing different policies
The relative performance of different heterogeneous policies
varies with production total. Using Eq. (10), the total net beneﬁt
potentials are calculated for the entire range of potential produc-
tion sites.
Fig. 3 depicts the course of potential net gains for an increasing
total production area under different heterogeneous schemes. As
the total area targeted by the policy increases, the curves diverge
as spatial heterogeneity in the targeted area increases. When the
total area targeted by the policy nears 70% of the entire region, the
total net beneﬁts under different heterogeneous schemes con-
verge; when all the farmers within a region receive funds, the
order of fund allocation or the selection of plots that receive funds
within the region does not matter. The largest difference betweenFig. 3. Total discounted net beneﬁts in euros for heterogeneous subsidy schemes
with bioenergy market prices of €4.50/GJ. Horizontal axis is the percentage of total
agricultural land deployed for Miscanthus production.
17 As: ( − ) |( )|Alternativescheme SFLB SFLB/
18 European fuel standards can be reached with further growth of ﬁrst-gen-
eration biofuel crops, in which case a total production of 17 PJ of second-generation
biofuels is required, or without further growth in ﬁrst-generation biofuel crops, in
which case 37 PJ is the required production growth. See Appendix A for details on
the construction of these ﬁgures.IAF and SFLB schemes at €4.50/GJ occurs near a conversion rate of
68% of the region. At this point, potential net beneﬁts of IAF
schemes are 17% higher. At €4.50/GJ the differences between
heterogeneous schemes are not very impressive, each policy has
its own optimum and these optima produce relatively similar net
beneﬁts. But Fig. 3 clearly shows an important aspect of hetero-
geneous schemes, the foregone beneﬁts of second-best hetero-
geneous schemes are approximately hyperbolic with the rate of
land-use conversion or aggregate subsidy spending.
To investigate further how different heterogeneous schemes
compare, we repeated the analysis for a range of bioenergy prices
with €0.10 increments. We compare the different policies to obtain
information on the overall convergence or divergence in perfor-
mance of the different policies when prices for bioenergy change.
For robustness, we are interested in comparing the performance of
policies when each policy is evaluated at its optimum and when
policies are evaluated at the point where they differ the most in
terms of efﬁciency. Therefore we computed two statistics for each
price level: I) the percentage difference between maximum netbeneﬁts, evaluated for each policy at its respective optimum, and
II) the percentage difference between net beneﬁts, evaluated at
the widest gap between the beneﬁt curves. We benchmark the
policies against the SFLB scheme to see how integrated and pro-
duction based schemes compare to land based heterogeneous
schemes. At low market prices, the second measurement is asso-
ciated with negative SFLB beneﬁts. For these cases, relative dif-
ferences are computed using an absolute valued denominator.17
Fig. 4 shows that the relative difference between net beneﬁts,
according to both measurements, varies strongly with bioenergy
prices. Ordinal performance stays, however, relatively stable over
the evaluated price range. IAF schemes, measured at both optima
and widest gaps, perform better than SFLB schemes, while the
MLPB scheme performs less. At the lowest evaluated price, the
SFPB scheme in optimum, performs less than the SFLB scheme in
optimum. It performs however better at low to mid-range prices.
When relative performance is measured at the widest gap be-
tween the net beneﬁt curves, the production based version of
single focus schemes performs better at any evaluated price level.
The largest relative differences in optima occur at low bioenergy
prices. A striking feature of 4I and 4II is the large spike around a
bioenergy price of €3.65/GJ. At this price, evaluated at its optimum,
the SFLB scheme is close to the social break-even point. This re-
sults in high relative differences. As prices increase, both
Figs. 1 and 2 show a convergence of heterogeneous schemes. The
general trend of high differences at low prices and convergence at
higher prices, can be attributed to an interaction between spatial
heterogeneity and bioenergy prices. When bioenergy prices are
low, many plots require a subsidy. There are initially high relative
rewards for subsidizing the right plots. When prices increase,
fewer plots require subsidy, and subsequently there is less het-
erogeneity in the remaining plots that require aids.
To investigate the potential beneﬁts of implementing spatial
variation in subsidy schemes, we compare the relative perfor-
mance against spatially homogeneous subsidies aimed at reaching
the European 2020 fuel standards.18 Fig. 5 depicts net potential
beneﬁts associated with both heterogeneous and conventional
schemes. Conventional schemes are clearly less efﬁcient but out-
perform the MLPB scheme. At 17 PJ, IAF schemes produce 28%
more gains than conventional land based subsidies. The net ben-
eﬁt curves of conventional schemes in Fig. 5 are less steep at the
37 PJ production total than for the 17 PJ production total. This is in
line with what was derived analytically from our model, the
marginal increase in aggregate subsidy spending between the
homogeneous schemes and heterogeneous schemes diverges as
the policy area increases. At the same time, at 37 PJ, an IAF scheme
increases net beneﬁts with 20%, slightly less than at 17 PJ. This
means that, while overfunding related to homogenous subsidies
increases, there is a sharper decline in the marginal beneﬁts of IAF
schemes. For the transition of 17 PJ to 37 PJ, the decrease in the
marginal potential net beneﬁts is thus stronger than the increase
in the forgone beneﬁts of conventional schemes.
The increase in foregone beneﬁts under conventional schemes,
however, has strong implications for environmental policy. When
conventional schemes are in place and international agreements
become more ambitious - energy targets are replaced with more
ambitious ones - subsidy schemes need to adjust to generate the
increased supply required. This means that all periodical aids are
required to increase to the level where additional farmers, with
Fig. 5. Aggregate discounted net beneﬁts in euros for each subsidy scheme with bioenergy market prices of €4.50/GJ.
Fig. 4. Relative net beneﬁts of heterogeneous schemes compared to SFLB schemes for a range of bioenergy prices depicted as; I) the percentage difference between the
optima of different policies, and II) the percentage difference evaluated at the widest gap between the potential beneﬁts associated with the different schemes.
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as well. The implication of having conventional schemes in place is
that it can form a disincentive for engaging in new and more
ambitious agreements. The results show that this effect might
even be slightly stronger for land based schemes than for pro-
duction based schemes. Under a conventional policy, at 37 PJ,
production based schemes have 5% higher potential net beneﬁts
than land based schemes. At 17 PJ, the difference is only a 2%.
The analysis also shows that minimizing land-use change
comes at relatively high costs. At 17 PJ, the potential gains are 33%
lower than those of IAF schemes, while the total land-use change
is reduced by around 11%. At 37 PJ, the gains are 27% lower while
the total land-use change is reduced by only 5%. In both cases, we
do not account for possible beneﬁts of minimizing total land-use
change, but the results imply that these have to be substantial if
MLPB schemes are preferred over IAF schemes. If the MLPB
scheme is, however, benchmarked against conventional schemes,
the additional required beneﬁts from minimizing the land-use
change need to be substantially smaller.
Final analysis shows that the results are robust to a range of
different prices. At both 17PJ and 37PJ we repeated the analysis
with €0.10 bioenergy price increments and noted the percentage
difference between alternative subsidy schemes and CLB schemes
to see how heterogeneous schemes compare to conventional
schemes depending on bioenergy market prices. Fig. 6 shows that
the alternative schemes are especially more efﬁcient whenbioenergy prices are low.
We can observe from the graphs that the initial differences in
relative performance of alternative schemes at low prices, are
higher for increased total bioenergy production. The rate at which
the curves converge is however also higher at increased total
production. Whether the relative performance of heterogeneous
schemes improves when bioenergy ambitions go up, thus depends
on the market price of bioenergy at which policies are evaluated.
This nonlinear effect is due to the net effect of a trade-off between
spatial heterogeneous interactions. When bioenergy prices are
low, a large amount of plots require subsidy and subsequently the
heterogeneity in subsidy requirements is high. Furthermore, when
total bioenergy production increases, more plots are required to
reach the target aggregate production quantity and heterogeneity
within production sites increases. Together, low prices and larger
aggregate production thus result in a high level of heterogeneity
due to increased heterogeneity in subsidy requirements and ad-
ditional heterogeneity due to the extended set of production sites
required to reach total production quantities. If, however, bioe-
nergy prices increase, heterogeneity in subsidy requirements de-
creases as the amount of plots that require subsidy decreases.
Heterogeneity decreases disregarding aggregate production
quantities, but the plots that will no longer require ﬁnancial sup-
port at elevated prices, make up a larger share of the production
sites at 17PJ than at an aggregate production quantity of 37PJ. As
an effect, the relative gains of preventing excessive funding of
Fig. 6. Total net beneﬁts of different schemes at bioenergy production levels of 17PJ and 37PJ.
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heterogeneous schemes perform relatively better at lower total
production if bioenergy prices are high. Disregard of this com-
plexity, IAF schemes are clearly more efﬁcient than conventional
schemes at any price for both aggregate production totals, and
MLPB schemes are relatively costly to society.6. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we explored the role of spatial heterogeneity in
biofuel stimulation schemes. Under heterogeneous subsidy allo-
cation, we ﬁnd that the potential gains from stimulating Mis-
canthus production are distributed according to the differences
between potential private proﬁts and potential net social beneﬁts.
The efﬁciency of a heterogeneous allocation is therefore strongly
determined by the order at which sites are targeted. We con-
sidered three types of heterogeneous schemes: 1) single focus
schemes that allocate subsidy based on private opportunity costs,
2) integrated agricultural focus schemes that additionally take into
account how conventional agricultural subsidies are distributed,
and 3) a scheme that minimizes land-use change. First, our results
show that conventional subsidy schemes that allocate a ﬁxed
amount of funds on a per-hectare basis, tend to overfund a large
part of the farmers who engage in biomass production, and that
under heterogeneous stimulation schemes, there is scope for
Pareto efﬁcient improvements with respect to current subsidy
spending. While heterogeneous schemes minimize overfunding,
they may misallocate funds. Our results show that a scheme that
targets plots based on the expected yields of bioenergy crops, is
less efﬁcient than conventional stimulation schemes in reaching
the 2020 mandate. We ﬁnd that schemes that follow private op-
portunity costs misallocate funds due to the heterogeneity in bothexternal beneﬁts of produced carbon offsets and the potential to
reduce conventional agricultural subsidies. The foregone beneﬁts
of non-optimal heterogeneous allocation is hyperbolic with total
land conversion. It is found that integrated agricultural focus
schemes optimize beneﬁts by reducing the conventional subsidy
for other agricultural activities, minimizing social costs of sus-
taining biofuel stimulation and minimizing both overfunding and
misallocation. Alternatively, one can view the differences in efﬁ-
ciency between single focus and integrated schemes not as prop-
erties of the schemes, but of subsidies that are currently in place
for conventional agricultural activities. The differences between
heterogeneous schemes are fairly small at higher bioenergy prices,
but increase substantially in the lower range. At high prices, many
sites do not require a subsidy, and there is less heterogeneity
among potential production sites. The link between the relative
importance of heterogeneity and energy prices is important con-
sidering the 2014 oil price drop. Second, we show that under both
single focus schemes and conventional schemes, production based
payments generate better results than land area based payments.
Again these differences are small at high bioenergy prices, but
increase in the lower range of energy prices. Third, under het-
erogeneous schemes, the marginal costs of engaging in more
ambitious environmental agreements follow only site-speciﬁc so-
cial costs, while under conventional schemes they increase rapidly
due to increased overfunding of farmers that have lower minimum
subsidy requirements. The most substantial increase in net bene-
ﬁts can be achieved when market prices for bioenergy are low and
environmental targets are ambitious. This is an important ﬁnding
and stresses the relevancy of spatial heterogeneity for policy since
many countries struggle with meeting their ambitious objectives
under current energy prices.
Our results add to the discussion around carbon contracts. In
recent years, agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the recent
Table AI
Input data on the energy-related variables applied in this study.
Variables Values
Required biofuel consumption in transport 611 PJ1
Miscanthus lignocellulosic energy content 5.95 GJ2
First-generation biofuel used 14 PJ3
Second-generation biofuel used 7 PJ3
Weighing factor ﬁrst-generation fuel 14
Weighing factor second-generation fuel 24
1 10% of the total energy used in the transport sector [23].
2 35% lignocellulosic energy conversion taken from [63], 17
GJ energy per oven dry ton taken from [7].
3 [19].
4 [19], only half of bioenergy production may be food-based.
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borate in creating emission trading markets. While the recent
agreement did not specify a global carbon price, it does recognize
its importance for providing incentives for emission reduction
activities. Furthermore, it mentions result based payments as an
important way to provide incentives for emission reductions. It
appeals to suggest that biofuel stimulation policies could be im-
proved by capping and trading. Supporting farmers through this
system can address problems related to the cost-efﬁciency differ-
ences arising from spatial heterogeneity and shift biofuel pro-
duction to farmers that face favourable production characteristics.
The cost effectiveness of cap-and-trade has been widely discussed
already in the 1970s regarding air pollution policies [8] and more
recently concerning agriculture. Speciﬁcally, it has been shown
that cap-and-trade programmes outperform tax-based policies [4].
A large body of literature on carbon sequestration also supports
integration with cap-and-trade [45,46,2]. In fact, our results cor-
roborate that homogenous production based schemes are more
efﬁcient than per-hectare payments. Especially at the lower range
of evaluated prices this improvement is substantial. However, a
problem related to the implementation of carbon sequestration
contracts is the high costs of quantifying the amount of seques-
tered carbon at every production site [56]. Obstructions of this
kind seem less stringent in the case of contracts for biomass
production, as the output of these activities can be more easily
measured since it is primarily the ﬁnal product itself that con-
tributes to emission savings. This suggests that there is a strong
case for policy targeting to reduce emissions by capping and
trading. However, our study reveals that the integration of biofuel
production into cap-and-trade by providing emission offsets re-
mains prone to inefﬁciencies that arise from spatial heterogeneity.
The results show that conventional production based schemes
over- and misallocate funds, and schemes that explicitly address
the heterogeneity in subsidy requirements, and possibly in the
distribution of externalities, increase beneﬁts substantially. Espe-
cially when total production of emission offsets increases, and
market prices for bioenergy are low, the amount of foregone
beneﬁts sum up considerably.
This study contributes to the general debate on the potential
contribution of the agricultural sector in reducing emissions, by
offering insights in more efﬁcient stimulation schemes. Prior to
implementing such policies, more extensive cost-beneﬁt analysis
that accounts for additional factors inﬂuencing local production
potential is needed. We suggest some extensions to the framework
presented in this paper. One potential drawback of our pixel-by-
pixel approach is that sites are treated as identically and in-
dependently distributed, while in reality farmers typically manage
several sites under a single budget construct and can be expected
to make managements decisions based on returns to the whole
farm operation. On a related note, our approach does not account
for economies of scale or risk aversion. As prices and yields are
stochastic, proﬁt, or expected value, maximization might deviate
from the true objective function of a risk-averse farmer. In this
case, the correct objective function will instead maximize ex-
pected utility of proﬁt, which could result in portfolio diversiﬁ-
cation. Risk is however not only related to volatility of market
prices and yields, but also to irreversibility of some investments.
While NPV methods are an established method for land-use va-
luation, there is a wide range of literature citing weaknesses that
relate to this type of risk. NPV methods treat investments as a
onetime only opportunity [17], based under assumptions con-
cerning future cash ﬂows under a static investment strategy that a
ﬁrm starts and completes as planned [66]. It is more realistic
however to subscribe to the idea that investments become less
risky into the future as the information set on which decisions are
based grows, and that information can alter investment strategiesalong the way as it becomes available. For most investment stra-
tegies, the horizon is relatively short, as in our application, and the
effect may not pose a signiﬁcant problem [48]. But in the case of
bioenergy, for which a fully developed market does not exist,
uncertainty regarding future cash ﬂows is high. While the pro-
duction of a perennial crop like Miscanthus allows very limited
altering of the investment strategy along the way, irreversibility
can be expected to play an important role in adaption and a better
approach would be to explicitly balance the beneﬁts of immediate
investment to those of waiting in to reduce risk [47]. Furthermore,
our analysis showed that arable farming, Miscanthus production,
and dairy farming, (here ordered by declining sensitivity to yield)
all have a distinct sensitivity to yield. Risk due to stochastic yields
will therefore have a distinct impact on the expected utility of
proﬁt for each land-use type.
Improving the level of detail in the assessment by incorporat-
ing the notions described above will certainly result in a more
precise analysis. However, while the addition of these complexities
will impact the exact amounts of subsidies required to initiate
bioenergy production, we expect our general conclusions to hold
as these do not depend strongly on the accuracy of point esti-
mates, but on the ordinality of efﬁciency results of different
schemes, which are shown to be robust for a range of different
prices. Future research might consider Real Option Value methods
to explore the impacts of heterogeneity under risk and irreversi-
bility of investments (see [50] for more extensive discussion), and
agent based models to explore the impact of moving towards more
detailed representations of farm operations.Acknowledgements
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Crop rotations for the two major production systems in our study, speciﬁed for soil
types.
Arable farming Clay Sand
Ware potatoes 17.09% 15.06%
Seed potatoes 13.03% 4.07%
Starch potatoes 0.33% 29.30%
Beets 16.10% 21.06%
Winter barley 0.77% 1.42%
Summer barley 2.74% 12.31%
Winter wheat 46.66% 10.27%
Summer wheat 2.85% 5.19%
Fallow 0.44% 1.32%
Dairy farming
Grass 89.0% 70.0%
Silage maize 11.0% 30.0%Appendix C. Modelling the dairy farming production systemTable CI
Variables and values used to model local production quantities.
Variables Values
Average number of cows per hectare 2.11
Average litres of milk per cow 81472
Energy need per cow per day Modelled3
Digestible energy content of feeding material 11.6 MJ per kg4
Grass supply Modelled5
Costs of silage maize Opportunity costs
Field operation costs Same as for grass6
Other animal costs (healthcare and breeding) €189 annual, per cow7
Milk processing costs €0.21 per litre8
Herd investment costs € 895 per cow9
Average lifetime of cow before replacement 5 years10
1 based on ﬁgures from [41], 2.1 is slightly above the national average of 1.9 but
below some locally observed values, which go up to 2.6.
2 based on ﬁgures from [41].
3 modelled following [6].
4 per kg oven dry grass and pelleted whole plant corn, taken from [54].
5 modelled per month following the method by [10] and rescaled using local
yield values.
6 taken from [63].
7 adjusted for inﬂation and tax, based on 3-year company survey performed by
PPP Agro Advice [11].
8 from [24].
9 four-year average price of two-year-old calf [41].
10 from [33].Appendix D. Frequency distribution of agro-economic
performance
According to our estimations, the frequency distribution of the
NPV of observed land use is left-skewed with a small number ofFig. D1. Distribution of the economic performance of the agricultural sector and
Miscanthus in the Netherlands.production sites facing losses. Several factors may explain this
outcome: 1) our estimation is negatively biased; 2) farmers pos-
sibly speculate on product prices and current land-use types
generating long-run losses are proﬁtable in the short run; 3) plots
that face negative NPV beneﬁt from unobserved comparative ad-
vantages such as regional specializations; 4) farmers do not fully
take into account in their decision process all the costs that are
included in our assessment; and 5) the agricultural sector is not
fully in equilibrium because of a high elasticity of land-use change.
The aggregate amount of production sites with a negative NPV is,
however, small and the overall distribution centres densely closely
above zero, which is likely in a competitive market.Appendix E. Spatial distribution of minimum required
subsidies
The map shows the considerable differences in minimum
Fig. E1. Spatial distribution of minimum required subsidies in the Netherlands.
B.P.J. Andrée et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 67 (2017) 848–862 861required subsidies for bioenergy production. Clay soils, located
mainly in the west of the Netherlands, perform economically
better than the sandy soils, located in the east and north of the
Netherlands. Clay soils coincide with areas where the minimum
required subsidies for Miscanthus production are higher.References
[1] Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. The Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Program
for Canadian agriculture (GHGMP). Technical report, Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada; 2003.
[2] Antle J, Capalbo S, Mooney S, Elliott E, Paustian K. Spatial heterogeneity,
contract design, and the efﬁciency of carbon sequestration policies for agri-
culture. J Environ Econ Manag 2003;46(2):231–50.
[3] Babcock Ba, Lakshminarayan PG, Wu J. The economics of a public fund for
environmental amenities: a study of CRP contracts. Am J Agric Econ
1996;78:961–71 (November).
[4] Bakam I, Balana BB, Matthews R. Cost-effectiveness analysis of policy instru-
ments for greenhouse gas emission mitigation in the agricultural sector. J
Environ Manag 2012;112:33–44.
[5] Batidzirai B, Faaij APC, Smeets E. Biomass and bioenergy supply from mo-
zambique. Energy Sustain Dev 2006;10(1):54–81.
[6] Bouwman AF, van der Hoek KW, Eickhout B, Soenario I. Exploring changes in
world ruminant production systems. Agric Syst 2005;84(2):121–53.
[7] Brosse, N, Dufour, A, Meng, X, Sun, Q, Ragauskas, A. Miscanthus: A fast-growing crop for biofuels and chemicals production; 2012.
[8] Burton E, Sanjour W. An Economic Analysis of the Control of Sulphur Oxides
Air Pollution. Technical report, Washington, DC; 1967.
[9] Caslin B, Finnan J, Johnston C. Miscanthus Best Practice Guidelines. Technical
report; 2015.
[10] College of Agriculture Food and Rural Enterprise. Grass Challenge for Dairy
Farmers, Challenge Note 2A - Grass Budgeting. Technical report, Department
of Agriculture and Rural Development, Northern Ireland; 2005.
[11] de Jong K. Resultaten Melkveehouderij Bedrijfsanalyse 2013. Technical report,
PPP Agro Advies, Ilpendam; 2013.
[12] de Wit M, Faaij A. European biomass resource potential and costs. Biomass-
Bioenergy 2010;34(2):188–202.
[13] Diogo V, Koomen E, Kuhlman T. An economic theory-based explanatory model
of agricultural land-use patterns: the netherlands as a case study. Agric Syst
2015;139:1–16.
[14] Diogo V, Koomen E, van der Hilst F. Second generation biofuel production in
the Netherlands. Technical report, Amsterdam; 2012.
[15] Diogo V, Koomen E, Witte F, Schaap B. Understanding the spatial distribution
of agricultural land use in view of climate-driven hydrological changes - Ex-
pert Pool Report. Technical report, Knowledge for Climate, Utrecht; 2013.
[16] Diogo V, van der Hilst F, van Eijck J, Verstegen JA, Hilbert J, Carballo S, et al.
Combining empirical and theory-based land-use modelling approaches to
assess economic potential of biofuel production avoiding iLUC: argentina as a
case study. Renew Sustain Energy Rev 2014;34:208–24.
[17] Dixit AK, Pindyck RS. The options approach to capital investment. Harv Bus
Rev 1995;73(3):105–15.
[18] Dornburg V, Faaij A, Verweij P, Langeveld H, van de Ven G, Wester F, et al.
Biomass Assessment: Assessment of global biomass potentials and their links
to food , water , biodiversity , energy demand and economy Main report.
B.P.J. Andrée et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 67 (2017) 848–862862Climate Change Scientiﬁc Assessment and Policy Analysis, 500114009(January
2008):0. 2008.
[19] Dutch Emission Authority. Naleving jaarverplichting 2012 hernieuwbare en-
ergie vervoer en verplichting brandstoffen luchtverontreiniging. Technical
report; 2013.
[20] Elbersen HW, Bakker RR, Elbersen BS. A simple method to estimate practical
ﬁeld yields of biomass grasses in Europe. In 14th European Biomass Con-
ference, 17–21 October 2005, Paris. Wageningen University; 2005.
[21] European Commission. Biofuels: aid per hectare of energy crops reduced as
the area exceeds 2 million hectares; 2007.
[22] European Commission. Political agreement on new direction for common
agricultural policy; 2013.
[23] Eurostat - Statistical Ofﬁce of the European Communities. Panorama of en-
ergy: Energy statistics to support EU policies and solutions. Technical report,
Luxembourg; 2009.
[24] Evers A, de Haan M, Blanken K, Hemmer J, Hollander C, Holshof G, et al. Re-
sults low-cost farm 2006. Technical report, Animal Sciences Group, Depart-
ment of Livestock Research, Lelystad; 2007.
[25] Farrell AE, Plevin RJ, Turner BT, Jones AD, O'Hare M, Kammen DM. Ethanol can
contribute to energy and environmental goals. Science 2006;311(5760):506–8.
[26] Fell H, Linn J. Renewable electricity policies, heterogeneity, and cost effec-
tiveness. J Environ Econ Manag 2013;66(3):688–707.
[27] Fischer G, Prieler S, van Velthuizen H, Berndes G, Faaij A, Londo M, et al.
Biofuel production potentials in europe: sustainable use of cultivated land and
pastures, part ii: land use scenarios. Biomass- Bioenergy 2010;34(2):173–87.
[28] Fischer G, Prieler S, van Velthuizen H, Lensink SM, Londo M, de Wit M. Biofuel
production potentials in europe: sustainable use of cultivated land and pas-
tures. part i: land productivity potentials. Biomass- Bioenergy 2010;34
(2):159–72.
[29] Flach B, Lieberz S, Rondon M, Williams B, Teiken C. EU Biofuels Annual 2015.
Technical Report GAIN Report Number: NL5028; 2015.
[30] Fleming Ra, Adams RM. The importance of site-speciﬁc information in the
design of policies to control pollution. J Environ Econ Manag 1997;33(3):347–
58.
[31] Fowlie ML, Muller NZ. Market-Based Emissions Regulation when Damages
Vary Across Sources: What Are The Gains From Differentiation? NBER Work-
ing Paper Series; 2013.
[32] Gomiero T, Paoletti MG, Pimentel D. Biofuels: efﬁciency, ethics, and limits to
human appropriation of ecosystem services. J Agric Environ Ethics 2010;23
(5):403–34.
[33] Gosselink J, Bos B, Bokma S, Koerkamp P. Oudere koeien voor een duurzame
veehouderij. Technical report, Wageningen; 2008.
[34] Hamelinck, CN, van Hooijdonk, G, Faaij, APC. Ethanol from lignocellulosic
biomass: Techno-economic performance in short-, middle- and long-term;
2005.
[35] Helfand GE, House BW. Regulating nonpoint source pollution under hetero-
geneous conditions. Am J Agric Econ 1995;77(4):1024–32.
[36] Hoogwijk, M, Faaij, A, Eickhout, B, De Vries, B, Turkenburg, W. Potential of
biomass energy out to 2100, for four IPCC SRES land-use scenarios; 2005.
[37] Just RE, Antle JM. Interactions between agricultural and environmental po-
licies: a conceptual framework. Am Econ Rev 1990;80(2):197–202.
[38] Koçar G, Civas N. An overview of biofuels from energy crops: current status
and future prospects. Renew Sustain Energy Rev 2013;28:900–16.
[39] Koomen E, Kuhlman T, Groen J, Bouwman A. Simulating the future of agri-
cultural land use in The Netherlands. Tijdschr Voor Econ En Soc Geogr
2005;96(2):218–24.
[40] Kuhlman T, Diogo V, Koomen E. Exploring the potential of reed as a bioenergy
crop in the Netherlands. Biomass- Bioenergy 2013;55:41–52.
[41] LEI. Land- en tuinbouwcijfers 2012. Technical report, The Hague; 2012.
[42] Mérel P, Wimberger E. Improving air quality in california's san joaquin valley:
the role of vehicle heterogeneity in optimal emissions abatement. J EnvironEcon Manag 2012;63(2):169–86.
[43] Ministerie van Economische Zaken Landbouw en Innovatie. Basisregistratie
Percelen 2012. Technical report, The Hague; 2013.
[44] OECD and FAO. OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024. Technical report,
Paris; 2015.
[45] Parks PJ, Hardie IW. Least-cost forest carbon reserves - cost-effective subsidies
to convert marginal agricultural land to forests. Land Econ 1995;71(1):122–36.
[46] Pautsch GR, Kurkalova La, Babcock B, Kling CL. the efﬁciency of sequestering
carbon in agricultural soils. Contemp Econ Policy 2001;19(2):123–34.
[47] Pindyck R. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment. J Econ Lit 1991;29
(3):1110–48.
[48] Pindyck RS. Uncertainty in environmental economics. Rev Environ Econ Policy
2007;1(1):45–65.
[49] Ragauskas AJ, Williams CK, Davison BH, Britovsek G, Cairney J, Eckert CA, et al.
The Path Forward for Biofuels. Science, 311(January); 2006:484–489.
[50] Regan, CM, Bryan, BA, Connor, JD, Meyer, WS, Ostendorf, B, Zhu, Z, Bao, C. Real
options analysis for land use management: Methods, application, and im-
plications for policy; 2015.
[51] REN21. Renewables 2015 Global Status Report. Technical report, Paris; 2015.
[52] Singh A, Smyth BM, Murphy JD. A biofuel strategy for ireland with an em-
phasis on production of biomethane and minimization of land-take. Renew
Sustain Energy Rev 2010;14(1):277–88.
[53] Smeets EMW, Faaij APC. Bioenergy potentials from forestry in 2050: an as-
sessment of the drivers that determine the potentials. Clim Change 2007;81
(3–4):353–90.
[54] Stanton TL, LeValley S. Feed Composition for Cattle and Sheep. Technical re-
port, Colorado; 2010.
[55] Stavins RN. What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? lessons
from SO2 allowance trading J Econ Perspect 1998;12(3):69–88.
[56] Stavins RN. The costs of carbon sequestration: a revealed-preference ap-
proach. Am Econ Rev 1999;89(4):994–1009.
[57] Styles D, Jones MB. Current and future ﬁnancial competitiveness of electricity
and heat from energy crops: a case study from Ireland. Energy Policy 2007;35
(8):4355–67.
[58] Tait J. The ethics of biofuels. GCB Bioenergy 2011;3(3):271–5.
[59] Tietenberg TH. Economic instruments for environmental regulation. Oxf Rev
Econ Policy 1990;6(1):17–33.
[60] van Bakel P, van der Waal B, de Haan M, Spruyt J, Evers A. HELP-2006; Uit-
breiding en actualisering van de HELP-2005-tabellen ten behoeve van het
Waternood-instrumentarium. Technical report; 2007.
[61] van Dam J, Faaij APC, Lewandowski I, Fischer G. Biomass production potentials
in central and eastern europe under different scenarios. Biomass- Bioenergy
2007;31(6):345–66.
[62] van den Broek R, Teeuwisse S, Healion K, Kent T, van Wijk A, Faaij A, et al.
Potentials for electricity production from wood in ireland. Energy 2001;26
(11):991–1013.
[63] van der Hilst F, Dornburg V, Sanders JPM, Elbersen B, Graves A, Turkenburg
WC, et al. Potential, spatial distribution and economic performance of re-
gional biomass chains: the north of the netherlands as example. Agric Syst
2010;103(7):403–17.
[64] van der Voort M, Timmer R, Geel W, Runia W, Corré W. Economie van En-
ergiegewassen. Technical report, Wageningen; 2008.
[65] van der Wolf M, de Klooster A. Kwantitatieve Informatie Akkerbouw en Vol-
legrondsgroenteteelt. Technical report, Wageningen; 2006.
[66] Voeks R. Real options: managerial ﬂexibility and strategy in resource alloca-
tion. J Bank Financ 1997;21(2):285–8.
[67] Wiesenthal T, Leduc G, Christidis P, Schade B, Pelkmans L, Govaerts L, et al.
Biofuel support policies in Europe: lessons learnt for the long way ahead.
Renew Sustain Energy Rev 2009;13(4):789–800.
[68] Young L. Carbon sequestration in agriculture: the U.S. policy context. Am J
Agric Econ 2003;85(5):1164–70.
